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Abstract:   
We use time-diary data on couples with children from the 2000 United Kingdom Time Use Survey to examine 
the impacts of own and partner’s wages on parents’ provision of child care and market work on weekdays and 
on weekends and holidays. We find that increases in partners’ wages increase women’s primary care on all days 
and decrease their market work on weekdays, while increases in women’s own wages increase their market 
work on weekdays. There is little evidence that men’s time use responds to changes in their own wages. 
However, an increase in men’s partners’ wages increases men’s passive child-care time on weekends and 
reduces their market-work time on weekends.  
Keywords  Time use - Child care - Wages  
 
Article: 
1   Introduction  
The wage and employment opportunities for women and men have changed tremendously in recent years, with 
women’s wages and opportunities substantially improving. From 1988 through 2005, the employment rate for 
women aged 16–59 in the U.K. increased from 64% to 70%; over the same period, real average gross weekly 
earnings for women employed full-time increased by 68%.
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 Increased market opportunities give women more 
choice, more independence, and perhaps more bargaining power within households. It is therefore of 
considerable interest to see how these changes affect women’s—and men’s—market and nonmarket uses of 
time, including the time they spend caring for children.  
The theory relating time-allocation decisions to wages does not yield clear predictions. In standard unitary 
preference models of household production, changes in own and partner’s wages lead to income and 
substitution effects and ambiguous predictions about the directions of the relationships with the uses of time 
(Becker 1981). The relationships are even more complicated in models that allow for bargaining, such as the 
collective utility framework (Chiappori 1992; Browning and Chiappori 1998) in which couples choose their 
time allocations to maximize a household utility function that is a weighted average of each partner’s individual 
utility, where the weights may depend on each partner’s resources.  
These ambiguous predictions have mixed implications for empirical work. On the one hand, the lack of strong 
or simple predictions makes it harder to test specific theories. On the other hand, the lack of clear predictions 
increases the need for empirical work to sort out the actual relationships. Predictions notwithstanding, wages 
remain important to all economic theories of household activities. In standard models, they represent an explicit 
price on market time and an implicit price on nonmarket time; they also represent potential resources to the 
household. In newer bargaining models, wages are an important determinant of individuals’ bargaining power 
within the household. Pollak (2005), in particular, has made this argument supporting the use of wages rather 
than actual labor market earnings in tests of these models. Finally, wages are a potential object of policy, 
whether directly through mechanisms such as the minimum wage and comparable worth requirements or 
indirectly through taxes, transfers, and subsidies.  
Unfortunately, research that directly examines the effect of wages on child-care time has been hampered by data 
limitations. A few data sets include accurate information on time use and market opportunities for both parents 
in a household. However, we have access to an unusually rich data set, the 2000 United Kingdom Time Use 
Survey (UKTUS), which includes detailed time diary information along with questionnaire data on wages and 
other personal characteristics for all adult household members. Using these data, we estimate gender-specific 
multivariate models of the time that parents in couple households each spend in primary child-care activities, 
passive child-care activities, and market work. The models include controls for both partners’ available wages. 
Because the adults in the UKTUS completed diaries on both weekdays and weekend days, our analyses are 
further able to distinguish between activities on different days of the week, giving us insights into the timing of 
activities.  
2   Literature review  
Estimates of own- and cross-wage elasticities of labor supply for couple households abound (see, for example, 
Blundell’s and MaCurdy’s 1999 review). Most of the literature suggests that women’s labor supply is more 
sensitive to changes in own and spouse’s wages than men’s labor supply. For example, a recent study by 
Devereux (2004) of 1980 and 1990 PUMS data from the U.S. found that labor supply among married women 
was modestly positively related to changes in their own wages and strongly negatively related to changes in 
their husbands’ wages, while labor supply among married men was essentially unrelated to changes in either 
their own or their wives’ wages. Similarly, an analysis of married British parents by Parera-Nicolau and 
Mumford (2005) found that mothers’ labor supply was negatively related to changes in their partner’s wages 
and that fathers’ labor supply was only weakly related to changes in their wives’ wages. However, the 
researchers reported a negative relation between mothers’ labor supply and their own wages and, in contrast to 
much of the literature, a strong positive relation between fathers’ labor supply and their own wages.  
The bulk of the research on household labor supply has been based on recall questions regarding usual hours 
worked. With the increasing availability of time-diary data, researchers are revisiting these findings and also 
looking at the relationship between wages and other uses of time. One finding from the new surveys is that 
estimates of labor supply elasticities may be sensitive to the methods used to collect the underlying data. 
Klevmarken’s (2005) analysis of the Swedish Household Panel Surveys revealed that own wage elasticities 
estimated using weekday time-diary data were larger than those estimated using retrospective annual work 
hours questions but similar to those estimated from previous-week recall questions. Within the time diaries, 
Klevmarken also found that the day of the week mattered, with own wage elasticities for weekdays being close 
to zero but elasticities for weekends being modestly negative for both men and women.  
In contrast to the large number of labor supply studies, only a few studies have looked at the effects of 
husbands’ and wives’ wages on parents’ child-care time, as we propose to do here.
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 Kooreman and Kapteyn 
(1987) used U.S. time-diary data on married couples and found that higher wages for fathers increased, and 
higher wages for mothers reduced the time mothers spent on child care, although these results were statistically 
insignificant. They did not find a strong relationship between fathers’ provision of care and either fathers’ or 
mothers’ wages. Maassen van den Brink and Groot (1997) looked at child care, other housework, and market 
work among working married and cohabiting mothers in the Netherlands. They found that mothers’ child care 
and market work both rose in response to increases in their own wages, but that these uses of time were not 
significantly related to partners’ wages. Hallberg and Klevmarken (2003) used Swedish data on dual-earner 
married and cohabiting couples and estimated models in which each parent’s time spent in child care depended 
on his/her own wages and market hours, paid child care, and the partner’s child care and work hours. They 
found that parents’ provision of child care was not directly related to changes in their own wages. However, 
they found that child-care time was negatively associated with own work hours and positively associated with 
partners’ child care and work hours.  
In a study framed as a test of household bargaining power, Friedberg and Webb (2005) examined data from the 
American Time Use Survey to see how couples’ time use varied with their relative wages. They reported that 
wives with relatively high wages enjoyed more leisure time on weekends and spent less time doing chores than 
wives with low relative wages. Wives with high relative wages also spent less time on weekday child care. 
Husbands’ time use was less sensitive than wives’ to changes in wages.  
We use recent time-diary data for the UK to calculate the effects of own and partner’s wages on the time 
mothers and fathers spend in child care and market work. In light of previous sociological research (e.g., Nock 
and Kingston 1988) and our own research (Kalenkoski et al. 2005) that shows that different intensities of child-
care activities may be important, we distinguish between time spent in primary and passive care activities. 
Following Klevmarken (2005) and Friedberg and Webb (2005), our analyses also distinguish between time use 
on weekdays and weekends/holidays.  
3   Data  
The data for our empirical analyses come from the United Kingdom Time Use Survey. The UKTUS is a 
national, household-based study with multiple questionnaire and time-diary components that was conducted in 
2000–2001. Each household in the study completed one questionnaire that provided information on household-
specific characteristics such as income and family composition. Each household member then completed 
another questionnaire providing information on personal characteristics such as education, employment status, 
and earnings. Finally, time diaries were collected for each individual age 8 and older; these identified the 
primary or secondary nature of activities, the location of each activity, and who else was present during each 
activity for every 10-min interval during two 24-h periods: one weekday and one weekend day. In sum, the 
UKTUS obtained 20,981 time diaries from 11,664 people living in 6,414 households.  
Of particular interest to us is the relation between time use and market wages within couple households. The 
individual questionnaire asks respondents to report their net monthly earnings. We construct wage measures by 
dividing this earning report by the respondent’s usual monthly work hours. While this approach is conceptually 
straightforward, several complications arise. The first is that the underlying earnings information is not 
observed for everyone in the UKTUS. The second is that wages may be endogenous. For example, a parent may 
accept a lower wage as a compensating differential for more flexibility and autonomy in the uses of time. 
Lastly, there may be some misreporting if respondents are not aware of their after-tax earnings or if they fail to 
account for government subsidies. Because of these problems, we predict wages for all of the men and women 
in our time-use analysis.  
We use two samples of the UKTUS for our analysis. The first is a general sample of adults that is used to 
estimate selectivity-corrected wage models and to predict potential wages, while the second is a narrower 
sample of parents in couple households with time-diary information that is used to analyze time use as a 
function of those predicted wages. Both samples exclude persons who fail to provide complete information on 
the variables of interest, residents of Northern Ireland (because we lack data on their local unemployment rates), 
and persons who are younger than age 16 or older than retirement age (65 for men, 60 for women). A small 
number of individuals who are enrolled in school (367) or in same-sex relationships (7) are also excluded. 
These exclusions result in a general sample of working-age and work-ready adults used to predict wages that 
includes 3,330 women and 3,190 men.  
The time-diary sample is further restricted to include only married or cohabiting individuals with household 
children under the age of 18. This sample also omits 402 ―incomplete‖ diaries (diaries that were missing more 
than an hour of information) and two diaries that contained four or fewer activities for the entire day. 
Incomplete diaries might underestimate time spent on the activities of interest. More generally, incomplete 
diaries and diaries with few activity reports are indicative of low quality (Juster 1985). These exclusions yield a 
time-diary sample of 1,056 households with 1,062 women and 1,023 men completing 2,012 and 1,931 diaries, 
respectively.  
We focus on three uses of time: primary child care, passive child care, and market work. Primary child-care 
activities are defined here to include physical care, teaching, playing, talking, escorting, and transporting 
children living in one’s own household. A shortcoming of the UKTUS and many other time-use surveys is that 
they do not identify time spent caring for own, non-coresident children. Our measure of passive care is 
constructed by summing up all time spent with children aged 14 and under that is not spent in child care as a 
primary activity, excluding time spent sleeping, working in the market, or in certain personal care activities.
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Market-work activities are specified to include first and second jobs, travel related to work (though not 
commuting time), and lunch and coffee breaks.
4
  
The questionnaire components of the UKTUS include many variables that we use as controls in our models. 
Among these are measures for the parents’ marital status, education, age, and health status. There are also 
controls for age of the youngest child (categorized into 0–3, 4–6, 7–11, or 12–17 years of age), the total number 
of children, the number of children aged 12–17 (who could themselves provide child care), the number of other 
adults in the household, and dummies to identify households located in a rural area, households with a disabled 
child, and households with unearned household income. In addition, there are controls for the region of 
residence, the season that the diary was completed, and the type of day (weekday, weekend, or holiday) of the 
diary report. Means and SDs for the time-use outcomes and the full set of explanatory measures for the time-
diary sample are reported separately by gender in Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the wage sample, also 
calculated separately by gender, are reported in Table 5 of the Appendix.  
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for variables in time-use samples  
Variable 
Women Men 
Mean SE Mean SE 
Outcome measures 
Minutes in primary child care—weekday 104.72 109.79 39.17 65.00 
Minutes in primary—child care—weekend/holiday 82.50 105.48 47.85 76.33 
Minutes in passive child care—weekday 298.89 243.04 177.25 187.83 
Minutes in Passive child care—weekend/holiday 404.71 295.90 338.15 290.22 
Minutes in market work—weekday 203.93 222.68 414.54 247.42 
Minutes in market work—weekend/holiday 56.35 141.26 108.43 209.34 
Explanatory variables 
Cohabiting 0.13 0.34 0.14 0.34 
Age 37.32 7.71 39.79  8.15 
Respondent has a health problem 0.10 0.29 0.09 0.28 
Youngest child age 0–3 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47 
Youngest child age 4–6 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.35 
Youngest child age 7–11 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.44 
Total number of children 1.85 0.86 1.85 0.86 
Number of children 12–17 0.65 0.82 0.63 0.80 
Disabled child 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 
Number of other adults 0.18 0.50 0.17 0.48 
Household receives unearned income 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 
Rural 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.50 
Winter 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41 
Variable 
Women Men 
Mean SE Mean SE 
Spring 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.44 
Summer 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 
Partner’s age 39.94 8.21 37.16 7.66 
Partner has a health problem 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29 
Number of observations 2,012   1,931   
Descriptive statistics calculated from the UKTUS 
 
4   Predicting wages  
As discussed above, we use a sample of 3,330 women and 3,190 men to analyze employment and wages and to 
subsequently predict net wages for the individuals in our time-use sample. A substantial portion of the people in 
our general sample do not report the information needed to construct the wage measures. The information may 
be missing for two reasons. First, there is the matter of employment itself—992 women and 623 men in the 
sample do not work and therefore have no earnings to report. Second, there is some item nonresponse among 
those who do work. In addition to the observations that are lost for these reasons, we purposefully exclude some 
other wage reports. Specifically, we drop earnings data for people who are self-employed as their incomes may 
reflect returns to capital and returns to labor. We also drop observations where the calculations of the net hourly 
wage are unreasonably high or low. The exclusions for missing data, self-employment, and out-of-range values 
further reduce the wage sample by 564 women and 964 men, leaving net wage observations for 1,774 women 
and 1,603 men.  
As there are two distinct mechanisms—nonemployment and incomplete or unusable reporting—that lead to 
missing wage data, we use a two-stage estimation procedure that addresses potential biases from these two 
sources of selectivity. In the first stage of this procedure, we jointly estimate gender-specific probit models of 
whether people worked and, conditional on their working, of whether they provided usable earnings 
information. In the second stage, we estimate gender-specific, selectivity-adjusted log net wage regressions, 
following Tunali’s (1986) bivariate correction method.  
Coefficient estimates and SEs from the first-stage conditional bivariate probit models are reported in Table 6 of 
the Appendix. Identification in these models requires that we include some variables in the (conditioning) 
employment probit that are not included in the (conditional) earnings reporting probit. We expect that 
characteristics of the partner, including his or her age, education, potential experience, and health, will influence 
employment outcomes but not reporting behavior, and we specify the models accordingly. For men and women, 
estimation reveals that the partner’s education and health are particularly powerful determinants of one’s own 
employment. The remaining variables, which are included in both equations, include measures for the person’s 
own education, age, potential experience, and health status; dummy variables for region of residence and 
residence in a rural area; dummy variables to identify cohabiting and single persons and those with some 
nonlabor income; a measure of the local unemployment rate; dummy controls for the season of the year; and 
household composition measures that indicate the age of the youngest child, the number of children in the 
household, the number of children ages 12–17, the number of other adults, and the presence of a disabled child.  
The results from the employment models are fairly standard, with the unemployment rate, education, age, and 
health status being significant predictors for women and men. The presence of young children is an additional 
significant predictor of women’s employment, while relationship status is an important predictor of men’s 
employment. There are fewer significant predictors in the conditional probits for reporting earnings. Education 
and the number of adults in the household are each significant predictors of reporting for men and women.  
The second-stage log net wage specifications include almost all the variables in the reporting probits and two 
correction terms to account for selectivity associated with employment and the availability of a useful wage 
report. The dummy variable indicating whether any nonlabor income was received and the number of other 
adults in the household were excluded to aid in the identification of the selection components. Results, reported 
in Table 7 of the Appendix, indicate that education, age, potential experience, and geographic location are 
significant predictors of log net wages.  
Our time-use equations incorporate a measure of each partner’s predicted log net wage not conditioned on 
employment or wage reporting status to gauge the impact of each partner’s market value of time on household 
time allocation decisions. To identify the effects of wages on time use, we exclude information on own and 
partner’s education and potential experience, the local unemployment rate, and the region of residence from the 
time-use models. Education and experience are assumed to impact market productivity, while the 
unemployment rate and geographic controls are assumed to capture labor market conditions. We also substitute 
information on the season of year for which the time diary is completed for the season of year for which the 
wage is reported. In addition to the results that we report, we have also estimated alternative time-use 
specifications that only rely on potential experience, the unemployment rate, and the regional controls for 
identification (i.e., specifications that included own and spouse’s education as independent variables). Estimates 
from these specifications were less precise but still consistent with those that we report. Formal tests showed no 
evidence of problematic overidentification from the education measures. Estimates and test results from these 
alternative specifications are available upon request.  
5   Multivariate analyses of parents’ time use  
Econometric specification   For our multivariate analyses of parents’ time spent in primary child care, passive 
child care, and market work, we face two further statistical challenges. The first is that the reported times spent 
in each activity are nonnegative with substantial numbers of observations massed at zero. Thus, we need 
multivariate models that are appropriate for censored-dependent variables. The second challenge involves the 
estimation of SEs for the model coefficients, which must be adjusted not only for the use of predicted wage 
variables but also for the use of repeated observations (clustering) for individuals and within households.  
To address the censoring in the dependent variables, we estimate standard maximum likelihood Tobit models of 
the different types of time use. One way to motivate the Tobit specification is to assume that people have 
preferred notional, or latent, amounts of time that they would like to spend in given activities (time that may be 
positive or negative). The actual time that people can spend in any activity must, however, be nonnegative. 
Thus, we observe the latent time if it is nonnegative and a censored value of zero otherwise. Although Tobit 
models address censoring, they also impose strong restrictions on the relationship between the discrete decision 
of whether to participate in an activity and the marginal decision of how much time to spend conditional on 
participation. The models are also sensitive to assumptions regarding the distribution of unobserved 
determinants of the outcome variable. If either of these specification assumptions is incorrect, estimates from 
the Tobit model will be biased and inconsistent. For example, Mroz (1987) has shown that estimates of married 
women’s labor supply are sensitive to these types of specification issues.  
Because of the restrictions and sensitivity of the Tobit model, we also estimate alternative Censored Least 
Absolute Deviations (CLAD; Powell 1984) and OLS specifications of our time-use models. The CLAD 
procedure places much weaker restrictions on the distribution of the unobserved components of the model. 
However, the procedure is less efficient than the Tobit approach and can only be applied in situations where the 
majority of observations for the dependent variable are uncensored. We also estimate OLS models. OLS does 
not address censoring as such. However, the procedure may be preferred in cases where everyone performs an 
activity, such as passive child care, but does not necessarily perform it every day (Blundell and Meghir 1987).  
To estimate the SEs in all these models, we employ a bootstrapping procedure. In this procedure, we first draw 
200 equally sized random samples of households—including all of the employment, wage, and time diary 
reports for each household—with replacement from our original general sample of households. For each 
random sample, we then apply our two-stage wage estimation procedure, use the resulting estimates to predict 
wages and, finally, estimate multivariate models of time use. For each model, this generates 200 sets of 
coefficient estimates, which we use as an approximation of the sampling distribution of the estimates.  
Tobit estimation results   Coefficient estimates, bootstrapped SEs, and marginal effects calculated at the sample 
means of the explanatory variables for the Tobit models of time use are reported in Table 2. The first four 
columns list results for the primary care models for mothers on non-holiday weekdays, mothers on weekends or 
holidays, fathers on non-holiday weekdays, and fathers on weekends or holidays. The middle four columns list 
similarly arranged results for time spent in passive care, and the final four columns report results for time spent 
in market work. Coefficient estimates and marginal effects are presented for the log net wages for the person 
and partner, three indicators for the age of the youngest child, counts of the total number of children and the 
number of children aged 12–17, an indicator for a disabled child, indicators for health problems for either 
parent, a count of the number of other adults, and an indicator for cohabitation status. In addition to these 
variables, the models also include indicators for unearned income and rural residence, controls for season of the 
year, and quadratic controls for own and partner’s age. For brevity, we do not report estimates for these other 
controls; detailed results are available upon request.  
 
Table 2 Coefficient estimates from Tobit models of time use  
Variabl
e 
Daily minutes of primary 
child-care time 
Daily minutes of passive child-
care time 
Daily minutes of market-work 
time 
Women Men Women Men Women Men 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Own 
potential 
log 
wage 
12.5 17.9 −0.5 37.9 6.4 58.7 −51.6 59.2 263.4
a
  27.6 20.2 −190.6 
(17.1) (22.5) (23.8) (28.0) (41.1) (58.1) (49.7) (80.7) (66.2) (134.7) (54.4) (139.5) 
10.1  11.9  −0.2  18.3  5.6  51.6  −37.7  47.9  152.9  4.8  18.4  −54.4  
Partner’s 
potential 
log 
wage 
47.1
b
  76.4
b
  10.4 25.1 10.6 25.2 41.3 110.4
c
  
−207.8
a
  
155.5 14.5 
−208.2
c
  
(21.2) (30.6) (20.7) (21.4) (52.1) (62.3) (41.4) (61.6) (72.4) (152.0) (50.1) (123.4) 
38.1  50.7  5.1  12.1  9.2  22.1  30.1  89.3  −120.6  27.4  13.2  −59.4  
Younges
t child 
age 0–3 
182.0
a
  229.8
a
  138.0
a
  162.8
a
  329.1
a
  419.1
a
  244.7
a
  429.5
a
  
−192.7
a
  
−187.8 7.9 84.1 
(18.3) (26.3) (21.6) (20.9) (45.0) (55.1) (44.5) (61.3) (67.3) (136.6) (51.8) (125.5) 
156.1  172.0  80.6  94.1  295.4  378.8  190.7  363.8  −103.9  −30.3  7.2  24.8  
Younges
t child 
age 4–6 
121.4
a
  146.2
a
  104.1
a
  101.2
a
  202.6
a
  397.9
a
  193.8
a
  420.3
a
  −18.5 6.6 53.4 87.7 
(16.1) (22.3) (18.4) (18.4) (45.1) (56.4) (40.5) (56.8) (68.8) (124.8) (51.9) (120.8) 
108.3  117.2  65.9  61.8  185.2  372.6  157.8  375.7  −10.6  1.2  49.2  26.8  
Younges
t child 
age 7–
11 
72.6
a
  83.5
a
  67.7
a
  65.8
a
  216.8
a
  321.2
a
  180.9
a
  376.9
a
  −14.4 −64.8 33.7 −13.7 
(11.9) (16.7) (14.4) (15.2) (34.5) (47.0) (34.3) (46.3) (53.7) (94.5) (36.8) (90.3) 
61.4  60.1  37.3  35.5  194.6  292.3  141.3  324.7  −8.3  −10.9  30.8  −3.9  
Number 
of 
children 
14.6
b
  0.0 4.9 −0.7 49.5
a
  16.4 26.9
b
  8.7 −65.8
b
  −56.2 −38.4
b
  3.9 
(5.7) (7.2) (7.0) (5.8) (13.8) (16.3) (12.4) (18.6) (27.4) (41.4) (18.1) (37.1) 
11.8  0.0  2.4  −0.3  42.9  14.4  19.6  7.0  −38.2  −9.9  −35.0  1.1  
Disabled 67.7
a
  55.8
b
  −13.4 7.0 66.4 33.6 132.0
b
  5.7 −240.1 63.3 −152.2 184.0 
Variabl
e 
Daily minutes of primary 
child-care time 
Daily minutes of passive child-
care time 
Daily minutes of market-work 
time 
Women Men Women Men Women Men 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
child 
a
  
(20.5) (21.8) (54.0) (23.2) (53.0) (73.4) (55.8) (76.4) (89.2) (253.3) (97.9) (163.1) 
59.7  41.7  −6.2  3.5  59.2  29.8  107.2  4.6  −108.2  12.1  −130.8  63.2  
Respond
ent has a 
health 
problem 
10.4 10.9 26.6
c
  1.3 −25.4 −18.4 14.3 58.2 
−118.6
b
  
−15.7 
−312.5
a
  
−322.0
a
  
(11.2) (13.1) (15.8) (19.0) (30.0) (39.5) (35.7) (52.1) (52.3) (94.7) (50.4) (105.7) 
8.5  7.4  14.2  0.6  −21.8  −16.1  10.6  48.2  −62.4  −2.7  −250.8  −68.5  
Partner 
has a 
health 
problem 
4.6 −10.0 6.7 13.5 −22.6 −29.8 −27.3 27.0 
−166.9
a
  
−64.2 −22.7 −12.6 
(16.2) (16.4) (11.3) (13.1) (36.9) (46.7) (26.8) (44.1) (63.5) (94.3) (39.9) (76.3) 
3.8  −6.5  3.3  6.8  −19.4  −25.9  −19.4  22.1  −83.6  −10.5  −20.6  −3.5  
Number 
of 
children 
ages 12–
17 
−16.3
b
  2.2 6.0 −0.8 −2.1 44.6
c
  12.8 26.7 34.7 16.4 −6.9 57.7 
(7.4) (10.0) (9.1) (8.7) (18.6) (23.8) (18.1) (26.8) (31.6) (50.4) (21.5) (50.0) 
−13.2  1.5  2.9  −0.4  −1.8  39.1  9.3  21.6  20.1  2.9  −6.3  16.5  
Number 
of adults 
−7.4 −24.9
b
  −10.5 −7.3 −45.8
b
  
−110.0
a
  
−22.6 
−105.7
a
  
−78.7
b
  −37.0 −10.3 −5.2 
(7.6) (11.5) (9.6) (12.1) (21.4) (29.1) (19.0) (31.9) (33.0) (57.4) (21.5) (54.3) 
−6.0  −16.5  −5.1  −3.5  −39.7  −96.6  −16.5  −85.4  −45.7  −6.5  −9.4  −1.5  
Cohabiti
ng 
−21.1
c
  −5.9 −19.8
c
  −12.7 −36.8 −41.3 −28.1 −53.1
c
  8.8 −49.6 −52.7
c
  66.7 
(11.1) (13.3) (10.4) (14.6) (22.9) (30.3) (24.7) (32.1) (46.7) (86.3) (31.7) (65.9) 
−16.6  −3.9  −9.0  −5.9  −31.4  −35.8  −20.0  −42.0  5.2  −8.3  −47.5  20.0  
Table reports selected coefficients, bootstrapped SEs (in parentheses), and marginal effects (in italics) from 
Tobit models of time use. Estimated using data from the UKTUS. Other variables included in all specifications 
were quadratics in both own and partner’s age, a dummy indicating household receipt of nonlabor income, a 
dummy indicating residence in a rural area, seasonal indicators, and an intercept. A dummy variable identifying 
holidays is included in the weekend specifications.  
a
Significant at the 1% level  
b
Significant at the 5% level  
c
Significant at the 10% level  
The focus of our analysis is on the associations that own and partners’ potential net wages have with time use. 
These are reported in the first two rows of Table 2. The estimates indicate that women in couple households in 
the U.K. increase their primary child-care time when their spouses’ or partners’ wages increase. The implied 
cross-wage elasticities, evaluated at the sample means, are 0.4 for weekday primary care and 0.6 for 
weekend/holiday care. However, women’s primary child-care time is unaffected by increases in their own 
wages. Men’s provision of primary care is unrelated to changes in their own or partners’ wages.  
The only statistically significant wage coefficient in the passive-care models indicates that on weekends and 
holidays, men partnered with higher earning women contribute more passive care time. One reason for the 
general lack of significance of the wage variables in the passive care equations is that passive-care times are 
highly variable, and so, estimates are accompanied by large SEs.  
In the market-work models we find, like much of the extant literature that women significantly increase their 
market time as their potential wages rise and decrease their market time as their partners’ potential wages rise—
but only on weekdays. The implied elasticities are 0.7 and -0.6. Neither own nor partner’s potential wage affect 
women’s market-work time on weekends. The patterns for men are different. Men’s weekday market-work time 
does not appear to respond to changes in their own or their partners’ net wages. However, men’s weekend and 
holiday market work does appear to be possibly negatively related to changes in their own wages (p 
value = 0.17) and is significantly negatively related to changes in their partners’ wages. The implied elasticities 
for these two associations are both −0.5.  
Other results indicate that child-care time is strongly related to the age and number of children in the household, 
as well as the presence of a disabled child. The age of the youngest child in the household has a large and 
significant positive effect on primary and passive child-care time for both parents on all days. The presence of 
younger children has a substantially larger effect than older children as, for example, women’s weekday 
primary child-care time is 156 min larger when the youngest child is age 0–3 versus age 12–17 (the 
omitted/base case in the models). Passive child-care time is universally more responsive in terms of absolute 
time spent than primary child-care time and more responsive on weekends than on weekdays, but this does not 
necessarily translate to a larger relative responsiveness as more time is spent on passive child care than on 
primary child care. Similarly, while women generally are more responsive in an absolute time sense than men to 
the age of the youngest child, they generally also spend more time on child care than men. This makes the small 
magnitude of the gender differential for passive child-care time on weekends all the more notable as it suggests 
that in this case men are somewhat more responsive in relative terms.  
By contrast, the age of the youngest child only has a significant impact on market time for women with children 
ages 0–3 on weekdays. These women work over one and a half hours less in the market on weekdays, and this 
difference is statistically significant. However, both men and women report less time in employment and more 
time in passive child care on weekdays the more children there are in the household. The number of children is 
also positively associated with women’s primary child-care time on weekdays, though the effect is small at only 
12 min for an additional child. The presence of a disabled child increases the time that women spend in 
weekday and weekend primary care by almost an hour; it also reduces the amount of time that women spend in 
weekday market work by over an hour and a half. Disabled children are not significantly associated with men’s 
provisions of primary care. However, disabled children are positively associated with men’s weekday passive 
care, which rises by over an hour and a half. In general, these results are consistent with greater care needs for 
disabled children.  
Health problems on the part of the respondent or his/her partner also impact time use. Own health problems 
significantly and substantially decrease market-work time for women on weekdays (about an hour) and for men 
on all days of the week (over 4 h on weekdays and about 1 h on weekends). Men with health problems also 
report more time on primary child care during weekdays, but the effect is small at 14 min. Partner’s health 
status is not a significant determinant of one’s own provision of primary or passive child care. Having a partner 
in poor health does significantly decrease weekday market work for women (by almost an hour and a half) but 
not for men.  
When we examine the results for older children and other adults in the household, we find that the number of 
children ages 12–17 decreases by a small amount women’s primary child-care time on weekdays. While this 
result is consistent with older children serving as substitute caregivers, we also find that children 12–17 increase 
the time women report spending on passive child care on weekends. This latter finding may reflect the different 
types of care required by older and younger children rather than caregiving on the part of older children. Other 
adults in the household have a more substantial impact on time use. The more other adults, the less time either 
parent spends on passive child care on any day with only the effect for men on weekdays being insignificant. 
Women also report spending a little less time on primary child care on weekends and substantially less time on 
the job on weekdays when there are other adults present. In general, the presence of other adults appears to 
reduce parental time in both primary and passive child care.  
Cohabiting parents of both genders spend a little less time on primary child care on weekdays relative to their 
married counterparts. Cohabiting parents also spend less time in passive care, though the estimated associations 
are only significant for men’s weekend care. Finally cohabitation status is associated with significantly less 
market work for men on weekdays.  
CLAD estimation results   We were able to estimate CLAD models for eight of our activity × gender × day-of-
week outcomes. For four of the outcomes—men’s weekday and weekend primary care and women’s and men’s 
weekend market work—there were too few positive observations to obtain estimates. As expected, given the 
lower efficiency of the CLAD procedure, there were also fewer significant findings among the models that we 
could estimate. Coefficient estimates and SEs from the CLAD models of time use are reported in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 Coefficient estimates from CLAD models of time use  
Variable 
Primary child-care 
time 
Passive child-care time Market-work time 
Women Women Men Women Men 
Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekday 
Own potential log 
wage 
−6.5 11.9 −0.7 94.9 −29.2 147.2 325.6
a
  11.8 
(22.3) (19.5) (61.3) (68.8) (45.5) (138.8) (97.6) (35.5) 
Partner’s potential log 
wage 
57.2
b
  28.3 −37.5 −33.2 −10.8 −20.8 −312.0
b
  18.5 
(28.0) (22.7) (76.5) (77.6) (50.0) (111.8) (131.5) (29.8) 
Youngest child age 0–
3 
164.4
a
  169.4
a
  298.4
a
  509.6
a
  258.0
a
  373.6
a
  −270.6
c
  −13.9 
(37.0) (41.2) (71.8) (77.4) (63.4) (136.3) (151.1) (33.5) 
Youngest child age 4–
6 
112.6
a
  95.7
b
  164.9
a
  522.5
a
  207.9
a
  356.5
a
  −66.8 10.6 
(34.9) (45.3) (61.5) (80.4) (56.9) (127.8) (107.7) (35.1) 
Youngest child age 7–
11 
59.6
c
  44.9 179.1
a
  439.1
a
  161.0
a
  303.4
b
  −51.7 −6.7 
(32.6) (44.3) (51.2) (65.9) (48.6) (126.1) (88.7) (29.8) 
Number of children 
11.8 2.1 63.6
a
  26.5 16.2 19.5 −49.0 −4.7 
(7.7) (6.4) (20.2) (16.9) (13.6) (29.4) (46.3) (11.0) 
Disabled child 
50.3
c
  62.4
c
  56.7 89.8 189.4
a
  168.9 −150.1 −121.1 
(28.5) (35.1) (76.3) (119.0) (71.3) (163.0) (129.8) (85.7) 
Respondent has a 
health problem 
15.9 21.0
c
  −19.8 −3.0 21.4 18.1 −238.3
c
  −465.7
a
  
(13.0) (12.5) (44.2) (45.5) (42.9) (73.3) (125.2) (106.1) 
Partner has a health 
problem 
−1.7 −29.8 −35.1 −201.9
c
  −37.7 −5.7 −316.3
a
  −14.2 
(22.0) (25.0) (60.8) (109.7) (33.3) (77.3) (120.6) (29.1) 
Number of children 
ages 12–17 
−21.7
c
  −0.1 −25.6 19.7 4.1 −49.6 20.5 −17.3 
(11.9) (9.8) (25.4) (35.5) (22.5) (52.1) (51.0) (18.0) 
Number of adults −4.7 −0.2 −38.9 −115.9
c
  −15.8 −66.5 −61.9 −1.8 
Variable 
Primary child-care 
time 
Passive child-care time Market-work time 
Women Women Men Women Men 
Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekend Weekday Weekday 
(12.4) (22.0) (26.8) (65.8) (35.1) (69.0) (49.0) (13.0) 
Cohabiting 
−12.0 −6.1 −11.8 −3.2 −16.1 −63.0 19.0 −21.2 
(15.3) (13.0) (29.6) (36.8) (25.7) (41.5) (68.9) (22.4) 
Table reports selected coefficients and bootstrapped SEs (in parentheses) from CLAD models of time use. 
Estimated using data from the UKTUS. Other variables included in all specifications were quadratics in both 
own and partner’s age, a dummy indicating household receipt of nonlabor income, a dummy indicating 
residence in a rural area, seasonal indicators, and an intercept. A dummy variable identifying holidays is 
included in the weekend specifications.  
a
Significant at the 1% level  
b
Significant at the 5% level  
c
Significant at the 10% level  
In the CLAD models for women’s weekday market work, the significant positive coefficient for own wages and 
the significant negative coefficient for partners’ wages from the Tobit models are reproduced. The positive 
coefficients on partners’ wages in the women’s weekday and weekend primary care models are also reproduced, 
though not at conventional significance levels for the weekend specification (p value = 0.21). The significant 
positive coefficients for young children on mothers’ primary care and both parents’ passive care are also 
reproduced. Many of the other significant coefficients from the Tobit model are also significant with similar 
signs in the CLAD specifications. However, a few of these coefficients lose their significance in the CLAD 
models. The similarity of the results across the alternative specifications suggests that the restrictions of the 
Tobit model do not unduly alter our findings.  
OLS estimation results   We also estimated each specification using OLS; results from these specifications are 
reported in Table 4. Most of the significance levels and marginal effects are similar to those found for the Tobit 
models. In only three cases did a significant result change, and in none of these cases did a sign change. Overall, 
our main results are quite robust to the choice of model specification.  
 
Table 4 Coefficient estimates from OLS models of time use  
Variabl
e 
Daily minutes of primary 
child-care time 
Daily minutes of passive child-
care time 
Daily minutes of market-work 
time 
Women Men Women Men Women Men 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Own 
potential 
log 
wage 
4.7 7.9 2.7 14.0 −3.1 45.5 −32.8 41.3 158.5
a
  −4.9 9.4 −40.0 
(14.0) (16.0) (11.9) (15.5) (33.2) (46.6) (35.6) (63.3) (38.0) (25.4) (44.3) (41.9) 
Partner’s 
potential 
log 
wage 
36.1
b
  46.6
b
  3.8 16.6 11.2 14.9 19.9 79.9
c
  
−123.1
a
  
7.6 9.5 −92.0
a
  
(17.3) (21.0) (11.0) (11.3) (42.3) (49.8) (31.3) (48.1) (39.4) (29.3) (40.4) (33.6) 
Younges
t child 
126.8
a
  146.1
a
  65.7
a
  74.0
a
  230.8
a
  307.2
a
  131.0
a
  271.7
a
  
−110.5
a
  
−39.3 7.9 28.3 
Variabl
e 
Daily minutes of primary 
child-care time 
Daily minutes of passive child-
care time 
Daily minutes of market-work 
time 
Women Men Women Men Women Men 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
Weekd
ay 
Weeke
nd 
age 0–3 (15.4) (18.4) (12.6) (11.1) (38.4) (44.4) (34.3) (48.3) (35.1) (27.3) (41.0) (36.9) 
Younges
t child 
age 4–6 
66.1
a
  64.1
a
  38.1
a
  26.3
a
  106.7
a
  288.7
a
  87.9
a
  257.8
a
  −32.4 −16.3 44.3 29.4 
(13.4) (14.6) (11.1) (9.3) (37.1) (45.9) (31.1) (44.8) (36.1) (25.0) (40.8) (33.7) 
Younges
t child 
age 7–
11 
24.9
a
  24.7
b
  21.4
a
  12.9
c
  124.8
a
  221.4
a
  79.4
a
  228.8
a
  −20.3 −20.9 27.5 −2.8 
(9.0) (9.6) (7.5) (6.7) (28.5) (36.7) (25.3) (35.4) (29.1) (18.3) (29.3) (27.5) 
Number 
of 
children 
13.9
a
  −1.3 3.8 −0.4 46.8
a
  14.0 25.8
b
  9.9 −31.9
b
  −6.9 −27.6
c
  −3.2 
(5.2) (5.7) (4.9) (3.7) (12.7) (14.1) (10.7) (15.5) (12.6) (6.0) (14.2) (11.4) 
Disabled 
child 
55.9
a
  35.1
b
  5.4 −0.5 55.4 17.3 101.6
b
  −6.5 
−121.6
a
  
0.2 −103.0 46.1 
(18.9) (15.6) (16.7) (9.5) (44.7) (60.2) (45.8) (60.3) (29.7) (29.2) (64.5) (56.4) 
Respond
ent has a 
health 
problem 
10.7 4.8 15.5
c
  4.0 −22.9 −15.5 −24.6 34.0 −49.6
b
  −1.4 
−218.1
a
  
−74.9
a
  
(9.2) (10.1) (9.3) (9.4) (24.3) (31.5) (19.2) (38.5) (24.8) (16.5) (32.5) (22.4) 
Partner 
has a 
health 
problem 
7.9 −7.8 0.8 2.6 −17.9 −32.1 14.9 17.6 −80.1
a
  −12.6 −12.4 −7.8 
(11.8) (9.7) (6.6) (6.9) (28.5) (36.2) (25.8) (33.7) (30.9) (17.3) (30.5) (21.7) 
Number 
of 
children 
age 12–
17 
−18.8
a
  0.5 3.8 −2.9 −18.8 24.9 −6.4 −3.4 18.2 −0.9 −8.2 12.5 
(6.4) (7.2) (5.4) (4.4) (16.6) (20.1) (14.9) (21.9) (15.9) (8.8) (17.4) (14.6) 
Number 
of adults 
−0.5 −0.8 −1.7 −0.3 −23.0
c
  −66.1
a
  −10.0 −56.5
a
  −36.0
b
  1.6 −3.2 −6.9 
(3.8) (4.2) (3.0) (3.0) (13.5) (17.3) (11.1) (17.4) (16.9) (11.5) (15.6) (14.8) 
Cohabiti
ng 
−16.6
c
  −4.3 −7.7 −5.0 −25.1 −24.0 −7.8 −34.4 9.3 −2.8 −38.3 25.5 
(9.8) (10.4) (5.5) (9.0) (19.6) (25.5) (19.4) (24.7) (24.0) (15.2) (24.8) (20.9) 
Table reports selected coefficients and bootstrapped SEs (in parentheses) from OLS models of time use. 
Estimated using data from the UKTUS. Other variables included in all specifications were quadratics in both 
own and partner’s age, a dummy indicating household receipt of nonlabor income, a dummy indicating 
residence in a rural area, seasonal indicators, and an intercept. A dummy variable identifying holidays is 
included in the weekend specifications.  
a
Significant at the 1% level  
b
Significant at the 5% level  
c
Significant at the 10% level  
 
6   Conclusion  
In this paper, we use time-diary data on couples with children from the 2000 United Kingdom Time Use Survey 
to investigate the effects of own and partner’s net wages on the time parents spend in primary child care, 
passive child care, and market work. We find that consistent with the previous literature, women increase their 
market time when their wage increases and decrease their market-work time as their partner’s wage increases. 
However, we find that this is true only on weekdays; there are no significant wage effects on women’s market-
work time on weekends. Also consistent with much of the previous literature, we find that men’s weekday 
market-work time is relatively insensitive to both their own and their partners’ wages. However, we find in our 
Tobit and OLS models that men whose partners have high potential wages spend significantly less time on 
market work on weekends. There is also some equivocal evidence that men with high wages work less on 
weekends.  
With respect to child-care time, we find that women whose partners have higher potential wages spend 
significantly more time on primary child care on all days. Men whose partners have higher potential wages 
spend significantly more time only on secondary child care and only on weekends. Neither men’s nor women’s 
child-care time is significantly associated with their own wages. Thus, we do not find cross-section evidence to 
support the proposition that women’s rising potential wages have negatively affected parental child-care time in 
the U.K. If anything, the increase in women’s wages may have prompted men to spend more time in passive 
care.  
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Appendix 
Table 5 Descriptive statistics for variables in wage sample  
Variable 
Women Men 
Mean SE Mean SE 
Employed 0.7021 0.4574 0.8047 0.3965 
Report a wage 0.5327 0.4990 0.5025 0.5001 
Log Wage (a) 1.7135 0.7601 1.8720 0.8428 
Cohabiting 0.1036 0.3048 0.1094 0.3122 
Single 0.3411 0.4742 0.2950 0.4561 
First or postgraduate degree 0.1144 0.3184 0.1238 0.3294 
Other degree 0.0252 0.1568 0.0524 0.2228 
Some higher education, no degree 0.1330 0.3397 0.0912 0.2880 
―A‖ level or vocational level 3 0.1018 0.3024 0.1395 0.3465 
―O‖ level, gcse grade a-c, or vocational level 2 0.2018 0.4014 0.1549 0.3618 
gcse below grade c, cse, or vocational level 1 0.0408 0.1980 0.0361 0.1864 
Other qualifications 0.0399 0.1958 0.0567 0.2314 
Age 38.3688 11.4842 40.7056 12.8244 
Potential experience 20.9009 11.9232 23.1749 13.2129 
Respondent has a health problem 0.1297 0.3361 0.1270 0.3330 
Youngest child age 0–3 0.1495 0.3567 0.1216 0.3269 
Variable 
Women Men 
Mean SE Mean SE 
Youngest child age 4–6 0.0748 0.2631 0.0558 0.2296 
Youngest child age 7–11 0.1309 0.3374 0.1031 0.3042 
Total number of children 0.8736 1.1035 0.7094 1.0479 
Number of children 12–17 0.2976 0.6297 0.2486 0.5926 
Disabled child 0.0138 0.1167 0.0075 0.0864 
Number of adults 0.4850 0.8995 0.5113 0.9104 
Household receives unearned income 0.2264 0.4186 0.2420 0.4284 
Unemployment rate 6.8877 3.7941 6.7864 3.7317 
Rural 0.4306 0.4952 0.4461 0.4972 
Northeast 0.0471 0.2120 0.0414 0.1992 
Northwest 0.1120 0.3154 0.1160 0.3203 
Yorkshire and Humberside and East Midlands 0.1991 0.3994 0.1940 0.3955 
West Midlands 0.0772 0.2669 0.0812 0.2732 
East 0.0979 0.2972 0.1056 0.3074 
South East (except London) 0.1282 0.3344 0.1313 0.3378 
South West 0.1018 0.3024 0.0962 0.2950 
Wales 0.0471 0.2120 0.0505 0.2189 
Scotland 0.1066 0.3087 0.1063 0.3082 
Winter 0.2384 0.4262 0.2335 0.4232 
Spring 0.2634 0.4405 0.2661 0.4420 
Summer 0.2270 0.4190 0.2398 0.4270 
Partner: First or postgraduate degree 0.0838 0.2771 0.0787 0.2693 
Partner: Other degree 0.0360 0.1864 0.0166 0.1278 
Partner: Some higher education, no degree 0.0658 0.2479 0.0972 0.2962 
Partner: ―A‖ level or vocational level 3 0.0934 0.2910 0.0693 0.2540 
Partner: ―O‖ level, gcse grade a-c, or vocational level 2 0.0958 0.2944 0.1364 0.3432 
Partner: gcse below grade c, cse, or vocational level 1 0.0207 0.1425 0.0254 0.1573 
Partner: other qualifications 0.0420 0.2007 0.0270 0.1620 
Partner’s age 28.6754 22.5138 29.2865 21.0584 
Partner’s potential experience 17.1309 15.4610 16.9937 14.6288 
Partner has a health problem 0.0736 0.2611 0.0853 0.2793 
Number of observations 3,330   3,190   
Table 6 Full sample selection controlled probits on wage reporting  
Variable 
Women Men 
Wage Report Employed Wage Report Employed 
Cohabiting 
0.0486 0.0925 −0.1525
c
  −0.3940
a
  
(0.1062) (0.1001) (0.0882) (0.1213) 
Variable 
Women Men 
Wage Report Employed Wage Report Employed 
Single 
0.0783 0.2597 −0.1181 0.3853 
(0.0896) (0.9094) (0.0959) (1.3292) 
First or postgraduate degree 
0.3036
c
  0.7164
a
  0.5762
a
  0.1175 
(0.1688) (0.1220) (0.1122) (0.1436) 
Other degree 
−0.4709
b
  0.6818
a
  −0.2373
c
  0.2308 
(0.1940) (0.1988) (0.1239) (0.1841) 
Some higher education, no degree 
0.0823 0.5647
a
  0.2751
a
  0.1513 
(0.1354) (0.0906) (0.0952) (0.1197) 
―A‖ level or vocational level 3 
0.0608 0.4002
a
  0.2573
a
  0.2931
a
  
(0.1302) (0.0945) (0.0819) (0.1042) 
―O‖ level, gcse grade a-c, or vocational level 2 
0.3003
b
  0.4248
a
  0.2907
a
  0.1524 
(0.1216) (0.0752) (0.0793) (0.0937) 
gcse below grade c, cse, or vocational level 1 
0.4315
b
  0.2112 0.2220 0.3961
b
  
(0.1831) (0.1320) (0.1372) (0.1882) 
Other qualifications 
−0.1685 0.3507
a
  −0.0897 0.0961 
(0.1614) (0.1340) (0.1178) (0.1333) 
Age 
0.0675 0.1379
a
  0.0976
b
  0.2245
a
  
(0.0609) (0.0496) (0.0450) (0.0478) 
Age squared 
−0.0011 −0.0022
a
  −0.0018
a
  −0.0029
a
  
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Potential experience 
−0.0048 −0.0028 −0.0171 −0.0366 
(0.0306) (0.0284) (0.0247) (0.0309) 
Potential experience squared 
0.0005 0.0005 0.0011
b
  0.0007 
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Respondent has a health problem 
0.2495 −0.9859
a
  −0.2679 −1.4898
a
  
(0.2334) (0.0724) (0.1925) (0.0823) 
Youngest child age 0–3 
0.1817 −0.7156
a
  0.1255 0.2401 
(0.2098) (0.1285) (0.1442) (0.2221) 
Youngest child age 4–6 
−0.0935 −0.2986
b
  0.0745 0.2950 
(0.1957) (0.1416) (0.1655) (0.2380) 
Youngest child age 7–11 
0.0046 −0.1684 0.0023 0.2063 
(0.1493) (0.1122) (0.1235) (0.1788) 
Total number of children 
−0.0483 −0.2687
a
  −0.1375
b
  −0.2531
a
  
(0.0992) (0.0562) (0.0652) (0.0900) 
Number of children 12–17 
0.0011 0.2031
a
  0.0817 0.2212
b
  
(0.1026) (0.0695) (0.0761) (0.1061) 
Disabled child 0.4927 −0.1118 0.2893 0.5449 
Variable 
Women Men 
Wage Report Employed Wage Report Employed 
(0.3321) (0.2089) (0.2889) (0.4328) 
Number of adults 
−0.0989
a
  0.0825
b
  −0.0883
b
  0.0593 
(0.0382) (0.0351) (0.0344) (0.0386) 
Household receives unearned income 
−0.0780 0.0758 0.0120 −0.0140 
(0.0707) (0.0653) (0.0610) (0.0770) 
Unemployment rate 
0.0106 −0.0462
a
  −0.0075 −0.0320
a
  
(0.0127) (0.0076) (0.0085) (0.0086) 
Rural 
−0.0915 −0.1270
b
  −0.1085
c
  −0.0341 
(0.0700) (0.0590) (0.0571) (0.0707) 
Northeast 
−0.0229 0.1828 −0.1095 −0.0190 
(0.1824) (0.1474) (0.1609) (0.1793) 
Northwest 
0.4282
a
  0.3267
a
  0.0983 −0.0059 
(0.1613) (0.1197) (0.1234) (0.1438) 
Yorkshire and Humberside and East Midlands 
−0.2113 0.3174
a
  0.0379 0.1330 
(0.1377) (0.1093) (0.1116) (0.1338) 
West Midlands 
0.2562 0.2437
c
  0.1440 0.0021 
(0.1694) (0.1288) (0.1326) (0.1524) 
East 
−0.2299 0.3417
a
  0.0119 0.1955 
(0.1536) (0.1275) (0.1241) (0.1567) 
South East (except London) 
0.2648
c
  0.2376
b
  0.1155 0.3777
b
  
(0.1499) (0.1177) (0.1182) (0.1506) 
South West 
0.0564 0.3385
a
  −0.1317 0.3057
b
  
(0.1601) (0.1252) (0.1272) (0.1555) 
Wales 
0.1851 0.2483 0.0375 0.0699 
(0.1924) (0.1513) (0.1527) (0.1773) 
Scotland 
0.1523 0.1489 0.1564 0.0392 
(0.1497) (0.1208) (0.1252) (0.1471) 
Winter 
0.1453
c
  −0.0784 0.0522 0.0082 
(0.0827) (0.0724) (0.0718) (0.0887) 
Spring 
0.1660
b
  −0.0575 0.0989 −0.1317 
(0.0809) (0.0702) (0.0717) (0.0839) 
Summer 
0.0520 −0.0943 0.0232 0.0007 
(0.0838) (0.0730) (0.0703) (0.0878) 
Partner: first or postgraduate degree 
  −0.1548   0.6580
a
  
  (0.1391)   (0.2142) 
Partner: other degree 
  −0.1976   −0.3065 
  (0.1597)   (0.2729) 
Variable 
Women Men 
Wage Report Employed Wage Report Employed 
Partner: some higher education, no degree 
  −0.0338   0.0153 
  (0.1199)   (0.1334) 
Partner: ―A‖ level or vocational level 3 
  0.0511   0.1987 
  (0.1118)   (0.1581) 
Partner: ―O‖ level, gcse grade a–c, or vocational level 2 
  0.0413   0.0267 
  (0.1061)   (0.1116) 
Partner: gcse below grade c, cse, or vocational level 1 
  –0.1732   0.1930 
  (0.1876)   (0.2517) 
Partner: other qualifications 
  0.1304   0.0730 
  (0.1396)   (0.1935) 
Partner’s age 
  0.0256   0.0594 
  (0.0577)   (0.0876) 
Partner’s age squared 
  −0.0005   −0.0006 
  (0.0006)   (0.0010) 
Partner’s potential experience 
  0.0300   −0.0051 
  (0.0347)   (0.0509) 
Partner’s potential experience squared 
  −0.0003   0.0000 
  (0.0006)   (0.0010) 
Partner has a health problem 
  −0.4224
a
    −0.4150
a
  
  (0.0995)   (0.1057) 
Correlation coefficient 
−0.1563   0.6092
a
    
(0.4093)   (0.1871)   
Number of observations 2,338 3,330 2,567 3,190 
Table reports coefficients and SEs (in parentheses) estimated using data from the UKTUS. 
a
Significant at the 1% level  
b
Significant at the 5% level  
c
Significant at the 10% level  
Table 7 Full sample log wage regression results  
Variable 
Women Men 
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Cohabiting 0.0176 (0.0370) 0.0583 (0.0418) 
Single 0.0021 (0.0298) −0.1148 (0.0447)
b
  
First or postgraduate degree 0.4397 (0.0716)
a
  0.1832 (0.0975)
c
  
Other degree 0.4312 (0.0956)
a
  0.4349 (0.0706)
a
  
Some higher education, no degree 0.2684 (0.0500)
a
  0.1274 (0.0599)
b
  
―A‖ level or vocational level 3 0.1319 (0.0468)
a
  0.1068 (0.0542)
b
  
―O‖ level, gcse grade a-c, or vocational level 2 0.0587 (0.0566) 0.0083 (0.0573 
gcse below grade c, cse, or vocational level 1 −0.0868 (0.0756) −0.0543 (0.0681) 
Variable 
Women Men 
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Other qualifications 0.0712 (0.0652) 0.0500 (0.0585) 
Age −0.0446 (0.0241)
c
  −0.0122 (0.0251) 
Age squared 0.0011 (0.0003)
a
  0.0008 (0.0004)
b
  
Potential experience 0.0306 (0.0112)
a
  0.0129 (0.0102) 
Potential experience squared −0.0015 (0.0003)
a
  −0.0012 (0.0003)
a
  
Respondent has a health problem −0.1133 (0.0729) −0.0934 (0.1016) 
Youngest child age 0–3 0.1699 (0.0708)
b
  −0.0341 (0.0629) 
Youngest child age 4–6 0.0838 (0.0703) −0.0819 (0.0704) 
Youngest child age 7–11 −0.0015 (0.0512) 0.0158 (0.0520) 
Total number of children −0.0411 (0.0350) 0.0284 (0.0350) 
Number of children 12–17 0.0175 (0.0357) −0.0277 (0.0350) 
Disabled child −0.0496 (0.1055) −0.0698 (0.1240) 
Unemployment rate −0.0033 (0.0042) −0.0179 (0.0038)
a
  
Rural −0.0305 (0.0276) −0.0296 (0.0299) 
Northeast −0.1682 (0.0645)
a
  −0.1983 (0.0709)
a
  
Northwest −0.1740 (0.0750)
b
  −0.1720 (0.0534)
a
  
Yorkshire and Humberside and East Midlands −0.1959 (0.0521)
a
  −0.1490 (0.0477)
a
  
West Midlands −0.1883 (0.0668)
a
  −0.1677 (0.0591)
a
  
East −0.1003 (0.0596)
c
  −0.0725 (0.0527) 
South East (except London) −0.0990 (0.0630) −0.1155 (0.0538)
b
  
South West −0.2115 (0.0566)
a
  −0.0727 (0.0585) 
Wales −0.2902 (0.0731)
a
  −0.1538 (0.0664)
b
  
Scotland −0.1864 (0.0569)
a
  −0.2134 (0.0585)
a
  
Winter 0.0072 (0.0332) 0.0335 (0.0314) 
Spring 0.0364 (0.0338) 0.0316 (0.0325) 
Summer 0.0220 (0.0308) 0.0234 (0.0305) 
Correction for employment −0.1528 (0.2658) −0.4969 (0.2735)
c
  
Correction for wage reporting 0.0040 (0.1177) −0.1240 (0.1806) 
Constant 2.0273 (0.4599)
a
  2.0390 (0.4956)
a
  
Number of observations 1,774   1,603   
Coefficients and SEs (in parentheses) from dual sample selection controlled log wage regressions estimated 
using data from the UKTUS.  
a
Significant at the 1% level  
b
Significant at the 5% level  
c
Significant at the 10% level  
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Footnotes 
1
 Authors’ calculation from Statistics UK data. 
2
 There is a related sociological literature that has examined how the provision of child care is related to own 
and partners’ work hours. For example, Nock and Kingston (1988) found that the amount of time that married 
parents spend in different types of child care activities is sensitive to each parent’s work schedule. Bryant and 
Zick (1996) found that increases in mothers’ work times only modestly reduced the time they spent in family 
care and did not affect the time that fathers spent in this activity. Bianchi (2000) has reported surprising 
evidence that mothers’ time spent with children has increased slightly over time, even as more mothers have 
entered the labor force.  
3
 The UKTUS does not identify the specific people who are present during an activity. Instead, for most 
activities, it lists categories of people present, including household children up to age 9, household children 
ages 10–14, other household members, and other known persons.  
4
 One might include commuting time as a market work activity, as it captures time away from home that 
otherwise could be used for child care. However, parents dropping off children at school or day care on the 
way to work may lengthen their commute to work, thus making it difficult to disentangle work-related and 
child-care time. Alternative estimates of our time-use models that include commuting time in the measure of 
market-work time were quite similar to those reported here that do not.  
 
